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THE COURT-OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
be under order of the Board of Fire Commissioners 38 to qualify for compensation
under either Workmen's Compensation Law or General Municipal Law, although
case law appears contra.39

Suicide
In Graham v. Nassau & Suffolk Lighting Company,40 an employee died by
falling into the stack of a superheater, the accident itself being unwitnessed. The
court held (4-3), reversing the Appellate Division41 and reinstating the award of
the Workmen's Compensation Board, that the presumption that this was an accidental injury and not suicide was not overcome by substantial evidence to the
contrary.
Workmen's Compensation Law §21 provides: "It shall be presumed in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary ... (3) that the injury was not
occasioned by the wilful intention of the injured employee to bring about the
injury or death of himself. . ." While this presumption may not substitute for
proof of accident, nevertheless it may be overcome only by substantial evidence to
the contrary. 42 Where there is such evidence the presumption fails, and the burden
43
reverts to the claimant.
The dissent,44 relying on the opinion in the Appellate Division, contends
that evidence in the form of a death certificate listing death as suicidal, a recent
divorce decree against the deceased, and the physical difficulties of falling accidentally into the superheater was such substantial evidence to the contrary. The
majority contends that the physical dimensions of the superheater did not make
an accident of this type improbable, and evidence of the lack of suicidal tendencies
on the part of the deceased, and of his plan to remarry after the divorce, made
motivation a question of fact for the Workmen's Compensation Board whose
45
decision was to be final
The instant case is illustrative of the difficulty the courts have had in deter38. Town Law §176 (11) authorizes the Board of Fire Commissioners to

provide for public inspections and parades.

39. See note 34, supra.

40. 308 N. Y. 140, 123 N. E. 2d 813 (1954).
41. 283 App. Div. 228, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 666 (3rd Dep't 1954).
42. Mcormack v. National City Bank of New York, 303 N. Y. 5, 94 N. E. 2d
887 (1951).
43. Magna v. Hagerman Harris Co., 258 N. Y. 82, 179 N. E. 266 (1932).
44. Lewis, C. J., and Fuld and Van Voorhis, JJ.
45. Workmen's Compensation Law §20 provides: ". . . the decision of the
Board shall be final as to all questions of fact."
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mining when evidence reaches the level of "substantial evidence to the contrary,"
but it is suggested that the majority decision in the instant case is the most cogent
resolution of fact and law.46
Silicosis-Date of Disability
Workmen's Compensation Law §44-a provides that "the employer in whose
employment an employee was last exposed to an injurious dust hazard shall be
liable for the payments required by this chapter when disability ... of the employee shall be due to silicosis or other dust disease."
In Dunleavy v. Walsh, Connelly, Senior & Palmer,47 claimant was permanently disabled with silicosis from a prior employment without his knowledge and
now seeks an award against his latest dust-exposure employer. The Court unanimously reversed the Appellate Division 8 (which had affirmed a denial of an award
by the Workmen's Compensation Board) and held that the policy behind this
section was to award disability payments for silicosis only when there was actual
inability to work, and then against the latest employer.
The Workmen's Compensation Board found that total disability occurred
before claimant entered into the employ of respondent. Disablement from an
occupational disease is an accident, 49 and the date of disability shall be such date as
the Board may determine on hearing the claim,50 with the only limitation that the
Board's decision be based on substantial evidence. 5' The court contends, however,
that since partial disability for silicosis is not compensable5 2 and since the carrier
of the latest employer against whom an award is given will be reimbursed out of
the special disability fund after 260 weeks, 53 the Legislature recognized the progressive character of silicosis and intended it should be compensable whenever an
employee should become totally unable to work. Protection of employers against
fraud may be found in the provision of the act providing that compensation will
not be given to an employee who at the time of his employment wilfully and
falsely represents in writing that he has not previously suffered from the disease
which caused his disability.54
46. See Epstein v. City of New York, 283 App. Dlv. 751. 128 N. Y. S. 2d 67
(1954), and Dubinsky v. Kofsky, 242 App. Div. 342, 275 N. Y. Supp. 365 (3rd Dep't

1934), where unwitnessed deaths were found to be accidental rather than suicide.
47. 309 N. Y. 8, 127 N. E. 2d 727 (1955).

48. 284 App. Div. 1075, 136 N. Y. S. 2d 31 (3rd Dep't 1954).
49. Workmen's Compensation Law §38.
50. Workmen's Compensation Law §42.
51. Cole v. Saranac Lake General Hospital, 282 App. Div. 626, 125 N. Y. S. 2d
891 (3rd Dep't 1953).
52. Workmen's Compensation Law §39; Cifolo v. General Electric Co., 305
N. Y. 209, 112 N. E. 2d 197 (1953).
53. Workmen's Compensation Law §15 (8) (ee) and 44-a.
54. Workmen's Compensation Law §43.

